对外经济贸易大学国际商法案例参考资料案例篇

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案例讨论1

Lucy et al. v. Zehmer et al. 84 S.E. (2d) 516, 196 Va. 493 (19)

Complainants instituted this suit to have specific performance of a contract by which it was alleged the defendants had sold to W.O. Lucy for $50,000 a tract of land known as the Ferguson farm, owned by defendant A. H. Zehmer. J. C. Lucy, the other complainant, is a brother of W. O. Lucy, to whom W. O. Lucy transferred a half interest in his alleged purchase.

The instrument sought to be enforced was written by A. H. Zehmer on December 20, 1952, in these words: “We hereby agree to sell to W. O. Lucy the Ferguson farm for $50,000, title satisfactory to buyer,” signed by both defendants.

The answer of A. H. Zehmer admitted that at the time mentioned W.O. Lucy offered him $50,000 cash for the farm but that he (Zehmer) considered that the offer was made in jest; that so thinking, and both he and Lucy having had several drinks, he wrote out the “memorandum” quoted above and induced his wife to sign it; that he did not deliver the memorandum to Lucy, but Lucy picked it up, read it, put it in his pocket, and attempted to offer him $5.00 to bind the bargain; that he refused to accept, and, realizing for the first time that Lucy was serious, assured him that he had no intention of selling the farm, and that he whole matter was a joke. Lucy left the premises insisting that he had purchased the farm. On Monday, December 22nd, Lucy engaged an attorney to examine the title. The attorney reported favorably on December 31st, and on January 2nd Lucy wrote to Zehmer stating that the title was satisfactory and that he was ready to pay the purchase price in cash, and asking when Zehmer would be ready to close the deal. Zehmer replied by letter asserting that he had never agreed or intended to sell the farm. Thereupon complainants brought this suit. The issue is whether the agreement was entered into with contractual intent or was merely a joke.

Buchanan, J. In his testimony Zehmer claimed that he “was high as a Georgia pine,” and that the transaction “was just a bunch of two doggoned drunks bluffing to see who could talk the biggest and say the most.” That claim is inconsistent with his attempt to testify in great detail as to what was said and what was done…The record is convincing that Zehmer was not intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequence of the instrument he executed, and hence that instrument is not to be invalidated on that ground.

The evidence is convincing also that Zehmer wrote two agreements, the first one beginning “I hereby agree to sell”; that Lucy told him that he wanted Zehmer’s wife to sign the memorandum; and that Zehmer tore up the first agreement and then made a second one which read “We hereby agree to sell.” Both he and his wife signed the second memorandum.

The appearance of the contract; the fact that it was under discussion for forty minutes or more before it was signed; Lucy’s objection to the first draft because it was written in the singular and he wanted Mrs. Zehmer to sign it also; the rewriting to meet that objection and the signing by Mrs. Zehmer; the discussion of what was to be included in the sale; the provision for examination of the title; the completeness of the instrument that was exe

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cuted; the taking possession of it by Lucy with no request or suggestion by either of the defendants that he give it back, are facts which furnish persuasive evidence that the execution of the contract was a serious business transaction rather than a casual, jesting matter, as defendants now contend.

In the field of contracts, as generally elsewhere, “We must look to the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than his secret or unexpressed intention. The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.” First Nat. Exchange Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 169 Va. 99, 192 S.E. 7.

The mental assent of the parties is not requisite for a formation of a contract. If the words or other acts of one of the parties have but one reasonable meaning, his undisclosed intention is immaterial expect where an unreasonable meaning which he attaches to his manifestations is known to the other party.

An agreement or mutual assent is of course essential to a valid contract but the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. So a person cannot set up that he was merely jesting when his conduct and words would warrant a reasonable person in believing that he intended a real agreement. Reversed. 思考题：

1．你是否认为，不管被告喝了多少酒，醉到什么程度，判决结果都会对他不利？ 2．被告先后签了两份协议对判决结果产生了什么影响？

3．法官在其判决意见的第三自然段列举了一系列的事实，其目的何在？ 4．如何理

解 “The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.”?

5．你认为本案被告 “表达出来的意思” 与 “保留与内心的意思” 是相同的，还是不同的本案的issue

为： “Whether or not the final agreement was entered into with contractual intent or was merely a joke.” 就是说Zehmer后来所立的协议是否是一有拘束力的合同，并且其后来无意出售农场是否受到此协议的约束。我的分析：

“The evidence is convincing also that Zehmer wrote two agreements, the first one beginning “I hereby agree to sell”; that Lucy told him that he wanted Zehmer’s wife to sign the memorandum; and that Zehmer tore up the first agreement and then made a second one which read “We hereby agree to sell.” Both he and his wife signed the second memorandum.” 可以说明，协议的重新拟订的过程确实是严肃认真的，并且做到了双方的合

意。 “ that so thinking, and both he and Lucy having had several drinks, he wrote out the “memorandum” quoted above and induced his wife to sign it; that he did not deliver the memorandum to Lucy, but Lucy picked it up, read it, put it in his pocket, and attempted to offer him $5.00 to bind the bargain;” 而且可以表明， Zehmer 虽然喝了酒，但绝对没有到不能理解协议内容的程度。综上，被告Zehmer虽没有出卖的意思，但其外在行为已足使原告或者其他人相信其本人有订约的意思。所以，

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“We must look to the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than his secret or unexpressed intention. The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.” 我们必须看当事人意图的外在表示，而不是其内在的未表示出来的秘不可测的意图。

1 ．思考题1 ，回答是否定的，也就是说不管被告喝了多少酒，醉到什么程度，判决结果不一定都对他不利，结合本案，如果被告喝酒喝得烂醉，以致于失去了理解协议内容的能力的话，我想判决就倾向于对他有利了。

2 。被告先后签了两份协议，如前所述，有理由使法官相信此一订立协议的过程是严肃认真的，且已做到了双方的合意，为一有效的有约束力的合同。

3 。其目的是为了说明订立合同有双方合意的证据，并不是开玩笑。

4 。结合本案，应理解为，法律所赋予人们的同意的意思表示应该以其意图的外在表示为准，而不应考察其未表示出来的真实的内心意思。

5 。我认为本案 “表达出来的意思” 与 “保留于内心的意思” 是不同的，也就是说，其实Zehmer 内心是不愿意为此一订立合同的行为的，但是，如前所述，第三人有理由通过Zehmer的言行相信他有订合同的意图，况且，基于诚实信用原则，如果允许人人在订好合同后在反悔，那么有关交易岂不变得混乱了！

luiswu1983

I agree with eric in all aspects but one,which is the last question presented above. why the defendant refused to perform the contract which has been legally formed between the two parties we do not know upon the whole context of this judgement.

but one must be emphasized is that the outward expression of the defendant is tandem with his secret or unexpressed intention.since the intention of defendant for concluding this contract is so serious(the reason is clearly claified by eric above) and the defendant ,although drinks so much,can understand the context and consequences of this contract and his wife who is an resonable person had signed her name on the agreement collaterally,we has no reasaon to conclude that outward expression of the defendant was in contravention of his secret or unexpressed intention. welcome to discuss below!

谢谢ERIC，我也一直想问这个案子，但太怕麻烦。我的疑问是

1.被告的妻子的签名是否具有法律约束力，（是不是还要考虑房产是否为夫妻共同财产的问题，其妻是否有代理权的问题~~我晕，可能我把问题复杂化了），如果有约束力，那被告就是喝的再醉，在判决也对他不利了。（但奇怪，原告怎么没提这点呢，可能还有一些其他事实罢？）

2.我觉得本案还有一个重要事实就是，当原告提出支付5美金作为对价时，被告意识到原告认真了，所以拒绝了，并说他是开玩笑的。他之所以没有进一步行动以阻止合同生效，就可以归结为当时的被告的精神状况（喝了很多酒），所以我认为，被告隐藏于心的意思与表达在外的意思是不同的。（但法官并没有强调这个事实，如果我是法官我可能就要作出有利被告的判决了，呵呵）既然被告已明确告诉了原告他是开玩笑的，为什么原告还可以合理以为合同成立？大家怎么认为呢？

其实着案子除了外在表现出的客观真实意思外---客观标准我认为还涉及了缔约能力

醉酒的人是否有缔约能力---认识标准（cognitive standard)，他是否有能力合理的理解交易的性质和后果见笑了！

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从英美法上说醉酒的人属于缺乏定约能力的人,依美国的法例,酗酒者订立的合同原则上有强制执行力,但如果酗酒者在定约时由于醉酒而失去了姓为能力,则可要求撤销合同. 所以还是要具体分析的. 案例讨论2 二．“格式之战”

Butler Machine

Tool Co. v. Ex—Cell---O Corp.

[1979] 1 W. L. R. 401, [1979] 1 ALL E. R. 956 (C. A.)

On 23rd May 1969, in response to an inquiry by the buyers, the sellers quoted a price for a machine tool of ￡75,535, with delivery to be given in 10 months. On the back of their offer were a number of terms and conditions, which stipulated that they were to “prevail over any terms and conditions in the buyer’s order”. One of the conditions purported to allow the seller to charge the buyers the price for the machine prevailing at the time of delivery. The buyers replied by placing an order for the purchase of the machine. Their document．nbspstipulated that the order was subject to a number of terms and conditions which differed from those put forward by the sellers and which, in particular, made no provision for any increase in price.

At the foot of the buyer’s order form, there was a tear-off slip upon which the sellers were invited to accept the order “on the terms and conditions stated thereon”. On 5th June 1969, the sellers completed and returned this slip to the buyers with a letter stating that the buyers’ order was being entered in accordance with the sellers’ quotation of 23rd May 1969. When the sellers ultimately came to deliver the machine, they claimed to be entitled to an additional ￡2,2, under the price formula of their original offer. The buyers took the position that their order prevailed and that there was accordingly a fixed price contract. The sellers’ action for damages succeeded at trial on the ground that the price variation clause in the sellers’ offer was a term which was intended to prevail.

Lord Denning M. R. … No doubt a contract was… concluded. But on what terms? The sellers rely on their general conditions and on their last letter which said ‘in accordance with our revised quotation of 23rd May’ (which had on the back the price variation clause). The buyers rely on the acknowledgment signed by the sellers which accepted the buyers’ order ‘on the terms and conditions stated thereon’ (which did not include a price variation clause).

If those document． are analyzed in our traditional method, the result would seem to me to be this: the quotation of 23rd May 1969 was an offer by the sellers to the buyers containing the terms and conditions on the back. The order of 27th May 1969 purported to be an acceptance of that offer in that it was for the same machine at the same price, but it contained such additions as to cost of installation, date of delivery and so forth, that it was in law a rejection of the offer and constituted a counter-offer. That is clear from Hyde v. Wrench [supra, at 33]. As Megaw J said in Trollope & Colls v. Atomic Power Constructions [[1962] 3 All E.R. 1035 at 1038] “… the counter-offer kills the original offer”. The letter of the sellers of 5th June 1969 was an acceptance of that counter-offer, as is shown by the acknowledgment which the sellers signed and returned to the buyers. The reference to the quotation of 23rd May 1969 referred only to the price and identity of the machine.

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The better way is to look at all the document． passing between the parties and glean from them, or from the conduct of the parties, whether they have reached agreement on all material points, even though there may be differences between the forms and conditions printed on the back of them. As Lord Cairns LC said in Brogden v. Metropolitan Railway Co. [(1877), 2 App. Cas. 666 at 672]:

… there may be a consensus between the parties far short of a complete mode of expressing it, and that consensus may be discovered from letters or from other document． of an imperfect and incomplete description.

Applying this guide, it will be found that in most cases when there is a ‘battle of forms’ there is a contract as soon as the last of the forms is sent and received without objection being taken to it. That is well observed in Benjamin on Sale [9th ed. (1974), 84-85]. The difficulty is to decide which form, or which part of which form, is a term or condition of the contract. In some cases the battle is won by the man who fires the last shot. He is the man who puts forward the latest term and conditions; and, if they are not objected to by the other party, he may be taken to have agreed to them. Such was British Road Services Ltd. V. Arthur V. Crutchley * Co., [[1968] 1 All E. R. 8ll at 816-817 (C.A.)] per Lord Pearson; and the illustration given by Professor Guest in Anson’s Law of Contract [24th ed. (1975), 37-38] where he says that “the terms of the contract consist of the terms of the offer subject to the modifications contained in the acceptance”. That may however go too far. In some cases, however, the battle is won by the man who gets the blow in first. If he offers to sell at a named price on the terms and conditions stated on the back and the buyer orders the goods purporting to accept the offer on an order form with his own different terms and conditions on the back, then, if the difference is so material that it would affect the price, the buyer ought not to be allowed to take advantage of the difference unless he draws it specifically to the attention of the seller. There are yet other cases where the battle depends on the shots fired on both sides. There is a concluded contract but the forms vary. The terms and conditions of both parties are to be construed together. If they can be reconciled so as to give a harmonious result, all well and good. If differences are irreconcilable, so that they are mutually contradictory, then the conflicting terms may have to be scrapped and replaced by a reasonable implication.

In the present case the judge thought that the sellers in their original quotation got their blow in first, especially by the provision that ‘These terms and conditions shall prevail over any terms and conditions in the Buyer’s order’. It was so emphatic that the price variation clause continued through all the subsequent dealings and that the buyer must be taken to have agreed to it. I can understand that point of view. But I think that the document． have to be considered as a whole. And, as a matter of construction, I think the acknowledgment of 5th June 1969 is the decisive document． It makes it clear that the contract was on the buyer’s terms and not on the sellers’ terms; and the buyers’ terms did not include a price variation clause.

I would therefore allow the appeal and enter judgment for the buyers. [Lawton and Bridge L.JJ. delivered concurring judgments.] 思考题：

1 。为什么法官说 “No doubt a contract was … concluded?”

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2 。对于“格式之战”的不同解决方法对要约人和受要约人的利益有何影响？

综合本案，我认为原告（seller）于23rd May, 1969 年的文书为一要约，并且包含

了 “prevail over any terms and conditions in the buyer’s order.” 条款；被告（buyer）于27th May, 1969 年的回复，正如案中所述，实际上已构成一反要约（counter-offer），并且包含有 “on the terms and conditions thereon” 的条款，而且，其中不包括调整价格的条款

（which did not include a price variation clause）。尔后在5th May, 1969年，原告接受了被告这一反要约，但在其中原告只提及品质及价格的有关条件，并未对众多的条款加以明

确 “The reference to the quotation of 23rd May 1969 referred only to the price and identity of the machine”, “The better way is to look at all the document． passing between the parties……” , 此一举动并不能使原告适用其于23rd May 1969所加的条

款 “prevail over any terms and conditions in the buyer’s order.”, 也就是说原告并不能因此而有权调整价格，所以，应该以被告的反要约为准来确定合同条款的适用，就是这样判定的。思考题：

1 ．我认为法官的意思是，不管合同的有关条款的适用以哪一份合同格式为准，在本案中，合同业已成立，即其中要约与承诺两个因素都已具备。

2 。对于“格式之战”的不同解决方法，在本案中，包括以下三种情况：

（1）。 “the battle is won by the man who fires the last shot”，也就是说要是另一方不反对而接受有关合同的格式文件的话，那么合同应以此格式为准而约束当事人双方。

------“He is the man who puts forward the latest term and conditions; and, if they are not objected to by the other party, he may be taken to have agreed to them.”

（2）。 “the battle is won by the man who gets the blow in first.”，在此种情形之下，比如说卖方出示一offer 的合同格式文件，而买方也回复其自身的另一不同的格式文件，那么除非当买方充分地提出所有的条款都遵循己方为准，则一般来说都对卖方有利，合同格式应以原先的卖方的为准。------“If he offers to sell at a named price on the terms and conditions stated on the back and the buyer orders the goods purporting to accept the offer on an order form with his own different terms and conditions on the back, then, if the difference is so material that it would affect the price, the buyer ought not to be allowed to take advantage of the difference unless he draws it specifically to the attention of the seller.”

（3）。 “the battle depends on the shots fired on both sides.”，按照案中所述，双方的条款和条件在此情况下应该合并起来考虑和处理：当能够彼此协调进而得出合理平衡的结果的话，那最好；当不能做到协调时，那么双方之间的彼此冲突的条款或条件应舍去，代之以合理的解释或推定。

------“There is a concluded contract but the forms vary. The terms and conditions of both parties are to be construed together. If they can be reconciled so as to give a harmonious result, all well and good. If differences are irreconcilable, so that they are mutually contradictory, then the conflicting terms may have to be scrapped and replaced by a reasonable implication.”

Leading Case:伦敦财产信托有限公司诉高树房产有限公司案

下面这个案例是中英文对照的，也是确立英国合同法上的允诺上禁止反言原则(promissory estoppel)的重要判例。

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CENTRAL LONDON PROPERTY TRUST LIMITED v. HIGH TREES HOUSE LIMITED.

1946 July 18. Denning J.

Contract - Agreement intended to create legal relations - Promise made thereunder - Knowledge of promisor that promisee will act on promise - Promise acted on - Enforceability of agreement without strict consideration - Agreement under seal - Variation of by agreement of lesser value - Estoppel.

By a lease under seal dated September 24, 1937, the plaintiff company let to the defendant company (a subsidiary of the plaintiffs) a block of flats for a term of ninety-nine years from September 29, 1937, at a ground rent of 2,500l. a year. In the early part of 1940, owing to war conditions then prevailing, only a few of the flats in the block were let to tenants and it became apparent that the defendants would be unable to pay the rent reserved by the lease out of the rents of the flats. Discussions took place between the directors of the two companies, which were closely connected, and, as a result, on January 3, 1940, a letter was written by the plaintiffs to the defendants confirming that the ground rent of the premises would be reduced from 2,500l. to 1,250l. as from the beginning of the term. The defendants thereafter paid the reduced rent. By the beginning of 1945 all the flats were let but the defendants continued to pay only the reduced rent. In September, 1945, the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants claiming that rent was payable at the rate of 2,500l. a year and, subsequently, in order to determine the legal position, they initiated friendly proceedings in which they claimed the difference between rent at the rates of 2,500l. and 1,250l. for the quarters ending September 29 and December 25, 1945. By their defence the defendants pleaded that the agreement for the reduction of the ground rent operated during the whole term of the lease and, as alternatives, that the plaintiffs were estopped from demanding rent at the higher rate or had waived their right to do so down to the date of their letter of September 21, 1945. Held (1.) that where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promisee, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it even although the promise may not be supported by consideration in the strict sense and the effect of the arrangement made is to vary the terms of a contract under seal by one of less value; and (2.) that the arrangement made between the plaintiffs and the defendants in January, 1940, was one which fell within the above category and, accordingly, that the agreement for the reduction of the ground rent was binding on the plaintiff company, but that it only remained operative so long as the conditions giving rise to it continued to exist and that on their ceasing to do so in 1945 the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the ground rent claimed at the rate reserved by the lease.

ACTION tried by Denning J. By a lease under seal made on September 24, 1937, the plaint

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iffs, Central London Property Trust Ld., granted to the defendants, High Trees House Ld., a subsidiary of the plaintiff company, a tenancy of a block of flats for the term of ninety-nine years from September 29, 1937, at a ground rent of 2,500l. a year. The block of flats was a new one and had not been fully occupied at the beginning of the war owing to the absence of people from London. With war conditions prevailing, it was apparent to those responsible that the rent reserved under the lease could not be paid out of the profits of the flats and, accordingly, discussions took place between the directors of the two companies concerned, which were closely associated, and an arrangement was made between them which was put into writing. On January 3, 1940, the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants in these terms, \"we confirm the arrangement made between us by which the ground rent should be reduced as from the commencement of the lease to 1,250l. per annum,\" and on April 2, 1940, a confirmatory resolution to the same effect was passed by the plaintiff company. On March 20, 1941, a receiver was appointed by the debenture holders of the plaintiffs and on his death on February 28, 1944, his place was taken by his partner. The defendants paid the reduced rent from 1941 down to the beginning of 1945 by which time all the flats in the block were fully let, and continued to pay it thereafter. In September, 1945, the then receiver of the plaintiff company looked into the matter of the lease and ascertained that the rent actually reserved by it was 2,500l. On September 21, 1945, he wrote to the defendants saying that rent must be paid at the full rate and claiming that arrears amounting to 7,916l. were due. Subsequently, he instituted the present friendly proceedings to test the legal position in regard to the rate at which rent was payable. In the action the plaintiffs sought to recover 625l., being the amount represented by the difference between rent at the rate of 2,500l. and 1,250l. per annum for the quarters ending September 29, and December 25, 1945. By their defence the defendants pleaded (1.) that the letter of January 3, 1940, constituted an agreement that the rent reserved should be 1,250l. only, and that such agreement related to the whole term of the lease, (2.) they pleaded in the alternative that the plaintiff company were estopped from alleging that the rent exceeded 1,250l. per annum and (3.) as a further alternative, that by failing to demand rent in excess of 1,250l. before their letter of September 21, 1945 (received by the defendants on September 24), they had waived their rights in respect of any rent, in excess of that at the rate of 1,250l., which had accrued up to September 24, 1945.

Fortune for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover rent on the basis of it being at the rate of 2,500l. a year, the amount reserved by the lease. The document．nbspin question was under seal and consequently could not be varied by a parol agreement or an agreement in writing not under seal. If there was a fresh agreement, it was void since it was made without consideration and in any event it was only an agreement of a purely temporary character necessitated by the difficult conditions prevailing when it was made, and coming to an end when those conditions ceased to exist at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945. Even supposing that the plaintiffs were held to be estopped from denying the existence of a new agreement, such estoppel would only operate so long as the conditions giving rise to the arrangement on which the estoppel was based, continued. [Denning J. This subject was considered by Simonds J. in Re William Porter & Co., Ld. [1937] 2 All E. R. 361.] I

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t has recently been considered by Humphreys J. in Buttery v. Pickard [1946] W. N. 25. He also referred to Forquet v. Moore (1852) 22 L. J. (Ex.) 35, Crowley and Others v. Vitty (1852) 21 L. J. (Ex.) 135 and Foa, Landlord and Tenant, 6th ed., p. 701. Ronald Hopkins for the defendants. The company are only liable to pay rent at the rate of 1,250l. per annum. The letters passing between the parties and the entry in the minute book of the plaintiff company constitute evidence of an agreement, which, although possibly not supported by such consideration as would strictly be necessary at common law, was of a type which a court of equity would enforce if it were satisfied that the parties intended to give contractual efficacy to that to which they were agreeing. The reduction in rent was made so that the defendants might be enabled to continue to run their business and that was sufficient to enable a court to hold the agreement binding on the plaintiff company. With regard to the variation of an agreement under seal by a parol agreement or an agreement in writing, in Berry v. Berry [1929] 2 K. B. 316, 319, Swift J. said it was true that a covenant could not be varied except by some contract of equal value, but, he continued \"although that was the rule of law, the courts of equity have always held themselves at liberty, to allow the rescission or variation by a simple contract of a contract under seal by preventing the party who has agreed to the rescission or variation from suing under the deed. In Nash v. Armstrong (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 259 it was held that a parol agreement not to enforce performance of a deed and to substitute other terms for some of its covenants was a good consideration for a promise to perform the substituted contract ...\" If the above contentions fail, the defendants rely on the doctrine of estoppel, The propositions of law laid down in Re William Porter & Co., Ld. [1937] 2 All E. R. 361 exactly apply to the present case. The reduction in the rent was made in order that the defendants might be able to carry on their business. As a result of the reduction the business was carried on and the defendants arranged their affairs on the basis of the reduced rent with the result that the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming any rent beyond 1,260l. per annum for the whole period of the lease. Finally, the letters passing between the parties constituted a waiver by the plaintiffs of their right to a higher rent than 1,250l. down to the date of their letter of September 21, 1945. Fortune in reply. DENNING J.stated the facts and continued: If I were to consider this matter without regard to recent developments in the law, there is no doubt that had the plaintiffs claimed it, they would have been entitled to recover ground rent at the rate of 2,500l. a year from the beginning of the term, since the lease under which it was payable was a lease under seal which, according to the old common law, could not be varied by an agreement by parol (whether in writing or not), but only by deed. Equity, however stepped in, and said that if there has been a variation of a deed by a simple contract (which in the case of a lease required to be in writing would have to be evidenced by writing), the courts may give effect to it as is shown in Berry v. Berry [1929] 2 K. B. 316. That equitable doctrine, however, could hardly apply in the present case because the variation here might be said to have been made without consideration. With regard to estoppel, the representation made in relation to reducing the rent, was not a representation of an existing fact. It was a representation, in effect, as to the future, namely, that payment of the rent would not be enforced at the full rate but only at the reduced rate. Such a representation would not give rise to an estoppel, because, as was said in Jorden v. Money (18) 5 H. L. C. 185, a representation as to the futur

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e must be embodied as a contract or be nothing. But what is the position in view of developments in the law in recent years? The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money (18) 5 H. L. C. 185. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts have said that the promise must be honoured. The cases to which I particularly desire to refer are: Fenner v. Blake [1900] 1 Q. B. 426, In re Wickham (1917) 34 T. L. R. 158, Re William Porter & Co., Ld. [1937] 2 All E. R. 361 and Buttery v. Pickard [1946] W. N. 25. As I have said they are not cases of estoppel in the strict sense. They are really promises - promises intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on. Jorden v. Money (18) 5 H. L. C. 185 can be distinguished, because there the promisor made it clear that she did not intend to be legally bound, whereas in the cases to which I refer the proper inference was that the promisor did intend to be bound. In each case the court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under the old common law it might be difficult to find any consideration for it. The courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for the breach of such a promise, but they have refused to allow the party making it to act inconsistently with it. It is in that sense, and that sense only, that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The decisions are a natural result of the fusion of law and equity: for the cases of Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1877) 2 App. Cas. 439, 448, Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London & North Western Ry. Co. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 268, 286 and Salisbury (Marquess) v. Gilmore [1942] 2 K. B. 38, 51, afford a sufficient basis for saying that a party would not be allowed in equity to go back on such a promise. In my opinion, the time has now come for the validity of such a promise to be recognized. The logical consequence, no doubt is that a promise to accept a smaller sum in discharge of a larger sum, if acted upon, is binding notwithstanding the absence of consideration: and if the fusion of law and equity leads to this result, so much the better. That aspect was not considered in Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605. At this time of day however, when law and equity have been joined together for over seventy years, principles must be reconsidered in the light of their combined effect. It is to be noticed that in the Sixth Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee, pars. 35, 40, it is recommended that such a promise as that to which I have referred, should be enforceable in law even though no consideration for it has been given by the promisee. It seems to me that, to the extent I have mentioned that result has now been achieved by the decisions of the courts. I am satisfied that a promise such as that to which I have referred is binding and the only question remaining for my consideration is the scope of the promise in the present case. I am satisfied on all the evidence that the promise here was that the ground rent should be reduced to 1,250l. a year as a temporary expedient while the block of flats was not fully, or substantially fully let, owing to the conditions prevailing. That means that the reduction in the rent applied throughout the years down to the end of 1944, but early in 1945 it is plain that the flats were fully let, and, indeed the rents received from them (many of them not being affected by the Rent Restrictions Acts), were increased beyond the figure at which it was originally contemplated that they

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would be let. At all events the rent from them must have been very considerable. I find that the conditions prevailing at the time when the reduction in rent was made, had completely passed away by the early months of 1945. I am satisfied that the promise was understood by all parties only to apply under the conditions prevailing at the time when it was made, namely, when the flats were only partially let, and that it did not extend any further than that. When the flats became fully let, early in 1945, the reduction ceased to apply. In those circumstances, under the law as I hold it, it seems to me that rent is payable at the full rate for the quarters ending September 29 and December 25, 1945. If the case had been one of estoppel, it might be said that in any event the estoppel would cease when the conditions to which the representation applied came to an end, or it also might be said that it would only come to an end on notice. In either case it is only a way of ascertaining what is the scope of the representation. I prefer to apply the principle that a promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply. Here it was binding as covering the period down to the early part of 1945, and as from that time full rent is payable. I therefore give judgment for the plaintiff company for the amount claimed. Judgment for plaintiffs.

Solicitors for the plaintiffs: Henry Boustred & Sons. Solicitors for the defendants: Callingham, Griffith & Bates. P. B. D.

伦敦财产信托有限公司诉高树房产有限公司案(1) ( CENTRAL LONDON PROPERTY TRUST，LTD. V．HIGH TREES HOUSE，LTD．) 泰挂译葛云松校案件事实

1937年9月24日，原告伦敦财产信托有限公司与被告高树房产有限公司签订了一份盖印租赁合同，(2)原告将一栋公寓楼租赁给被告，租期99年，从1937年9月29日起算，租金为每年2500英镑。这栋公寓楼是新建的。由于很快就开始了二战，许多人离开了伦敦，所以公寓楼没有被全部转租出去。在当时无法逆转的战争情势下，被告显然不可能将公寓完全转租。两公司的负责人都明白地意识到，在这种情况下被告无法从转租中取得足够的收入，从而也就很难向原告支付预定的租金。双方协商后，于1941年初达成书面协议，将租金从租赁开始时起削减为每年1250英镑。

这样，被告按每年1250英镑的数额支付了从1941年到1945年初的租金。到了1945年初时，二战即将结束，公寓楼中的所有公寓都租了出去，但此后被告仍按此数额支付。1945年9月21日，原告给被告写信称，租金应当从租赁期一开始就按照最初合同规定的全额(每年2500英镑)支付，并说被告欠租数量为7916英镑。后来，原告向英国高级王座分庭提起了这个友好诉讼，(3)以弄清楚在被告应当支付多少租金问题上的法律状况。在诉讼中，原告起诉要求的金额是625英镑，这是1945年以后两个季度被告不愿支付的租金额，因为原告主张年租金应为2500英镑，而被告只愿意以1250英镑的年租金额支付，这样在两个季度中被告不愿支付而原告认为应当支付的租金额是625英镑。被告在答辩中主张：1、双方因削减租金而往来的书信构成了一个合同，因此租金应为1250英镑，并且这个合同的效力及于整个租赁期；2、作为替代抗辩理由，(4)原告公司既然已经同意按照1250英镑计算年租金，根据禁止反言原则应被禁止主张超过每年1250英镑的租金，3、更进一步的替代抗辩理由是，由于原告在其1945年9月21日的信件之前(被告9月24日收到)，并没有主张超过1250英镑的租金，应认为他们已经放弃了主张任何超过每年1250英镑的租金的权利，直到1945年9月24日为止。

英国高级王座分庭的判决 ( Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice) 丹宁法官：

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(在陈述了事实后继续阐述)如果我不顾近来法律上的发展来考虑这个问题，则毫无疑问，如果原告提出请求，他们就可以被宣告有权获得从租赁期一开始起以每年2500英镑计算的租金。因为租金支付所依据的租赁合同是一份盖印租赁合同，根据过去的普通法，它不能够被一份非正式的协议(5)(不论是否采取书面形式)变更，仅可以通过盖印合同变更。(6)但是衡平法出来干预了，它说，如果简式合同被用来变更一份盖印合同(在法律要求租赁合同应当采取书面形式的情况下，此变更协议亦应采用书面形式以为证明(7)，可以认可其效力，就如同在Berryv．Berry((1929)2K.K.316)案中体现的那样。但是这一衡平法原则很难适用于本案，因为这里的变更协议可能被说成是无约因的。(8)就禁止反言原则而言，这里的关于减少租金的陈述并非对于一个既存事实的陈述，实际上它是一个关于未来的陈述，即租金的支付将不再按照原定的全额来执行，而是按照削减的金额支付。这样的一个陈述不适用禁止反言原则，因

为 Jorden v．Money((18)5H．L．C．185)案说明，关于未来的陈述或者体现为一个合同，或者什么也不是。(9)但由于近年来法律的发展，现在的法律是什么状况呢：自Jorden v． Money案以来这方面的法律尚未稳固地确定下来。在过去的五十年里有一系列的判例，尽管它们被称作关于禁止反言的判例，但实际上并非如此。它们是这样的判例：一个人以创设法律关系为目的而作出一个允诺，并且允诺人知道，接受允诺的人将根据这个允诺行事，并且他确实根据允诺行事了。在这样的案件中，说，允诺必须兑现。我特别想提出的判例有Fenner v．Blake((1900)lQ．B，426)；

Re Wickham((1917)34 T．L．R．158)；Re William Porter E Co，. Ltd．((1937)2 AlI E．R．361)和Buttery v．Pickard ((1946) W．N．25)。我已经说过，它们并非严格的意义上的关于禁止反言原则的判例。(10)它们实际上是允诺——期望其发生拘束力，期望其被据以行事，并且对方也确实据之行事了。Jor—den v．Money案中的事实与这些判例并不相同。(11)因为该案中允诺人明确地说明她并不打算在法律上受约束，而在我提到的那些判例中，恰当的推断是，允诺人确实打算受约束。在上面的每一个判例中，都认为进行允诺的当事人应当受到允诺的约束。尽管根据过去的普通法可能很难为之找到任何约因。还没有走得很远以致于使违反这种允诺造成的损害赔偿具备诉因。但他们拒绝允许允诺人进行与之不一致的行为。在这个意义上，也仅在这个意义上，这种允诺使禁止反言原则适用。这些判例是普通法和衡平法融合的一个自然的结果，因为 Hugees v．Metropolitan Ry．((1877)2 App．Cas．439，448)、Birmingham an District Land Co．v．London ＆ North Estern Ry．((1888)40 Ch．D．268，286)和 Salisbury(Marquess) v．Gilmore((1942)2K．B．38，51)都根据充足的理由认为，在衡平法上，不允许一方当事人违反这样一个允诺。我认为，承认这种允诺有效的时候现在已经到了。无疑，这一观点在逻辑上的结果是，一个关于只需收到对方进行较小金额的给付就可以算成是实际的较大数额的债务已获清偿的允诺，如果已经被据以实施了，就是有约束力的，约因的缺乏可以不论；并且，如果这是从普通法和衡平法的融合可以推导出的结论，那就更好了。这方面的问题在 Foakes v．Beer案中没有进行考虑。但是今天，普通法和衡平法已经合为一体70年了，法律原则应当根据它们的这种融合而重新考虑。应当注意到，在法律修改委员会第6号中期报告的第35、40段中建议，象我前面提出的这种允诺应当在法律上是可执行的，尽管被允诺人并未为之提供约因。我认为，在我所提及的范围内，各的判例现在已经使这样的结果发生。我相信象我所说的这种允诺是有约束力的，进而在本案中，剩下来的唯一需要我考虑的问题是允诺的范围。我在所有证据的基础上认为，这里的允诺是，在由于当时的主要形势公寓楼没有全部或者近于全部租出去的时间里，作为一项权宜之计，将租金削减为每年1250英镑。这意味着租金的削减应适用到1944年底前的几年，但在1945年初显然公寓已经全部租出去了，并且从公寓上得到的租金(许多公寓没有受到租金管制法的影响)甚至超过了当初设想的假如租出去可以得到的租金数额。当初双方无论如何肯定仔细考虑过可以从公寓出租上获得的租金。我查明，削减租金时的主要形势到1945年的前几个月时已经完全过去了。我确信在允诺作出时，各方当事人都明白，允诺仅仅在允诺当时的主要形势之下适用，即，当公寓仅为部分租出去的时候适用，允诺没有超出这个范围。当1945年初公寓全部租出去时，租金削减不再适用。

在这些情形下，根据我理解的法律，我认为1945年9月29日和12月25日到期的两个季度的租金应以

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全额支付。

如果本案原本是一个禁止反言的案件，则一种看法可能认为，当陈述所适用的条件终结时，禁止反言原则就停止适用，或者也可能有意见认为，只有在进行了通知的情况下它才不再适用。这两种看法都只是用以确定陈述的范围的方法。我倾向于认为，一个允诺人期望其发生约束力，期望其被据以行事，并且对方也确实据之行事的允诺，在其内容被恰当适用的范围内具有约束力。(12)在本案中的允诺在直到1945年初之前的时期内是有约束力的，从那时起就应当支付全额的租金。因此我判决原告公司胜诉，可以获得请求的款项。作者单位：北京大学法律学系

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(1947) I K．B．130；(1947)L.J．R，77；175L．T．333；62T．L.R．557．本案是确立英国合同法上的允诺上禁止反言原则(promissory estoppel)的重要判例，由英国当代最著名的法官和法学家丹宁勋爵(Lord Denning)判决，是英国合同法历史上最著名的判例之一，至今仍然发挥着极大的作用。本案主要的法律背景是，在英美法上，合同的成立除了需要双方当事人的合意之外，原则上还需要有约因存在，否则合同就不能被执行。可是，在很多情况下，当事人之问达成的协议虽然没有约因存在，但不承认其效力对一方当事人是很不公正的。本案确立的允诺上禁止反言原则，就是承认那些没有约因但符合一定条件的协议有一定的法律效力的法律规则。鉴于国内出版的许多书籍中都已经涉及本案，所以译者不对本案作详细评述。有关本案的背景和在法律上的意义，请参考[英]丹宁：《法律的训诫》，杨百揆等译，群众出版社1985年版，第170页以下；杨桢：《英美契约》，北京大学出版社1997年版，第88页以下。在这里，译者只是加注若干译注，以帮助一般读者理解。

盖印合同(ontract under SeaI)，是英美合同法上的一种以特殊形式达成的合同。在英国法律的早期，只有盖印合同才在法律上是可执行的，其他合同(包括一般的书面合同)原则上并不承认其效力。盖印合同的达成要求当事人以书面记载，对文本进行蜡封并盖上印章，并且须交付给对方当事人。后来蜡封盖印的形式被简化，通常在合同上印上“seaI”或者“L．S．(拉丁文 Locus sigilli的简写)”即可。盖印合同是正式合同，非正式合同(英美法常称简式合同5imple Contract)后来逐渐被承认有执行力，但必须有约因存在。但盖印合同作为正式合同，即使没有约因也可以成立。盖印合同和简式合同还有其他很多方面的区别，但逐渐地都消灭了。在美国已经有很多州通过制定法完全废除了盖印合同，也就是说合同在成立要件上都需要遵循一般规则，不再有盖印合同这一种特别方式。

友好诉讼(friendly proceedings)，英文也作 friendly suit， amicable action， case agreed On，指双方当事人虽然对于相关事实没有争议，但是对于究竟应当适用什么法律发生了争议。于是，他们达成一个协议，将纠纷提交，以通过的判决获知有关法律问题的结论。即如果前一个理由不支持，就主张这个理由作为替代。

原文是 an agreement by parol，字面意思是口头协议，但在普通法上，它指的是没有采取盖印形式的其他协议，包括口头的和书面的，所以丹宁勋爵在括号中说“不论是否采取书面形式”。其意思相当于非正式合同或者简式合同，所以这里译作非正式的协议。

See BIack’s Law Dictionary， fifth edition， West Publishing Co.,1979， p．62。

由于盖印合同是正式合同，所以在旧的普通法上，协议对盖印合同的变更也必须通过另一个盖印合同的方式进行。如果双方达成的对盖印合同进行变更的协议在形式上采用的是简式合同，而不是盖印合同，则此变更协议不能生效。这一规则后来受到衡平法的修正。

一般来说，法律上并不规定哪些合同应当用盖印合同的方式，是由当事人决定将他们认为有必要的合同以盖印合同的方式达成。在这里所说的衡平法原则之下，对于一个盖印合同，原则上可以用书面或者口头的协议加以变更。但是，法律规定几类合同必须采用书面形式(Statute of Frauds)，则如果当事人是用盖印合同方式达成这样一个合同，那么变更它的协议虽不必采用盖印合同方式，但至少必须采用书面形式。

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这里是一种典型的欠缺约因的合同。因为对于原告消灭自己的每年1250英镑租金的允诺，被告没有付出任何对价，只是单纯受对方的恩惠，所以这个新协议是没有约因的。

禁止反言原则(estoppel)是英美法上的非常有特色的制度。它包括数种具体的情形，总的说，就是在特定情况下，为了保障对方当事人的正当利益，禁止当事人主张自己原本享有的某项权利或者否认自己曾经作出的陈述(尽管该陈述的确是虚假的或者本应没有法律效力的)。Jor—den v．Money案的案情是， Money欠 Jorden1200英镑， Jorden多次向 Money表示其愿意免去其债务。因此，基于自己的这个沉重的债务负担已被免除， Money才敢于结了婚。关于Jor-den能不能改变主意向 Money追讨这笔欠款的问题，英国上议院(英格兰的最高司法机构)判决认为，此债务免除的协议无约因，不构成合同；而普通法上承认的禁止反言原则仅适用于对既存事实的虚伪陈述，而不适用于对未来的意愿所进行的陈述，所以 Jorden仍然可以向 Money追讨这笔钱。传统的禁止反言原则的内容如前所述，相应的概念

是 equitable estoppel(衡平法上禁止反言原则)。本案中，丹宁勋爵多次说本案实际并非禁止反言的案件，指的是它不属于传统的禁止反言案件，而本案确立的原则被称为 promissory estoppel(允诺上禁止反言原则)。所以，对于判决中关于本案是否是一个禁止反言的

Joeden v．Money can be distinguished”，此处译为“Jorden v．Money案中的事实与这些判例并不相同”。英美法的核心制度是遵循先例原则，一个判例中针对特定事实所适用的法律规则，在以后审理事实实质相同的案件中，应当同样适用。但如果两个案件的事实在实质上并不相同，则自然不应适用相同的法律规则。分析两个案件的事实并认为它们有根本区别，就称为 distinguish。这句话的意思是，允诺有效的范围决定于其内容，具体范围要在案件中具体衡量。国商英文案例商业组织法最后一案国商英文案例商业组织法最后一案 Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation 到底谁赢了？

1. 本案争议的关键是什么？涉及到什么基本法律问题？

2. 如果是在公司正常经营决策中，本案董事会是否有权决定为了B类股东的利益而回购A类股票？被告的上述计划怎样违反了其应承担的义务？为什么？ 3. 原告最后获得的赔偿是多少？

4. 公司章程规定了A类股的权利是A类股可转化为B类股，以及在公司清算时获得2倍于B类股的资产分配，

同时规定公司在清算时有权决定以每股60美元回购A类股。这两方面的规定有何内在关系和作用？首先，本案是原告zahn胜诉了。我简要说说我的看法。各题答案如下：

1，董事会在公司清算前为了B类股的股东的利益而回购A类股是否合法。涉及的法律问题是“董事及有控制权的大股东对少数股东的信托义务”，“少数股东的利益保护”问题。

2，根据法官的意思，本案中董事会有权基于诚信而回购A类股票，但是无权为了B类股东的利益而回购A类股票。被告作为有控制权的大股东违反了他对少数股东所负有的信托义务（fiduciary duty）。有控制权的大股东可以依法取得对公司的控制权，但是他这种控制权是一种基于信托而产生的权力，有控制权的大股东在处理公司事务时必须依善意行事且必须是为公司和相关利益人所认为公平的。

3，对于尚未被回购的A类股：所得赔偿应是其根据公司章程在公司清算时所应该分得公司财产的分额。对于已被回购的A类股：应是其根据公司章程在公司清算时所应该分得公司财产的金额与被回购所得的那部分金额之间的差额。

4，我认为这两方面的规定的内在关系是相互制约的。因为：

前者规定了“A类股可以在公司清算时获得2倍于B类股的资产分配”，而后者就相应地规定了“公司在清算时有权决定以每股60美元回购A类股”这两个规定是相互抵触的；前者又规定了“A类股可转化为B

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类股”，又使得后者的规定实现不了。所以我认为两者是相互制约的。

作用就在于既要保护A类股股东和B类股股东的利益，又要使他们的利益达到一种平衡。

单纯地看前者的规定，A类股在公司清算时拥有了可以在公司清算时获得2倍于B类股的资产分配的权利，在某种情况下会损害B类股股东的正当利益，所以就有了后者的相应规定，“公司在清算时有权决定以每股60美元回购A类股”，因为B类股是有表决权的，所以此时公司的决定既B类股股东的决定。B类股股东可以根据这项规定来维护自己的利益。

单纯地看后者的规定，B类股股东则可以利用他们对公司的控制权随意作出以每股60美元回购A类股的决定，从而损害A类股股东的利益而增加自己的利益。所以前者又规定了“A类股可转化为B类股”A类股股东可以以此来保护自身的利益。

大家要注意案例后面的Note on Further Proceeding in Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation （首先请大家允许我在这把Proceeding in Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation姑且称为三审，前面那个案例为二审。）

二审与三审的差别首先在于赔偿的数额不同。二审赔偿数额的基准是A类股根据章程规定所应分得的公司财产分额，而三审是将A类股转化为B类股所应分得的分额。

二审认为董事会为了B类股股东的利益而回购A类股是完全违法的，而三审则认为董事会为了B类股股东的利益而回购A类股本身没有错，错就错在没有将公司相关的财务信息公布给A类股股东，使得他们不知公司到底有多少资产，B类股股东因此违反了信托义务。

我个人认为Further Proceeding （三审）的判决比较合理。公司章程的相关规定我已经简要论述了一下，这里就不多说。

公司章程就是公司的“”，既然董事会根据“”的规定回购A类股，而被告又是合法取得了控制权，所以是无懈可击的。假设董事会将信息全部公开的话，A类股股东如果觉得60美元一股的价钱不如B股分配公司的财产所得的话，则完全可以将A类股转化为B类股来保护自己的利益。所以三审认为被告的错仅在于没有将相关的信息公布给A类股股东，所以否定了二审的判决。

所以就体现在了赔偿数额上的差异

回复：求助：国商英文案例商业组织法最后一案

[QUOTE]以下是引用mashaoer在2003-9-27 17:01:07的发言：以下是引用mashaoer在2003-9-27 16:57:37的发言： I agree with Newever in the first two questions.THe gist of the controversy before the court and us is that whether the resolution of the board of directors dominated by Transameria Corporation to redeem the stock of Class A at the price of ＄60 plus accrued dividends is invalid or not,viz. whether the allegation of the plantiff's complant is true. The basic legal questions are whether there is fiduciary ralationship between the directors 最新下载(NewDown.com.cn) 中国最大、最专业的学习资料下载站转载请保留本信息

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and the corportion or the stockholders,or between the controlling shareholders and the corporation or minority shareholders, and the quantum or extent of the breach of the fiduciary duty by the board and the controlling stockholder.

最后一句的quantum到底是什么意思！是个拉丁语词汇，在这里的意思就是“多大程度” of what degree的意思吧。

再问newever和mashaoer：

在合同法第二个案例里，appeallent和respondent弄得我同昏脑胀。 appeallent 是否就是最初的被告，而respondent就是最初的原告？

mashaoer是四川人吗？你的英语很好啊，看你写的英语跟案例中的一样formal。

不是这样的。appellant是上诉人，respondent是被上诉人。谁不服下级的判决而提起上诉谁就是上诉人（appelant），不管是下级审判时的原告还是被告。本案中上诉人是原告，zahn

我在很大程度上同意NEWEVER的意见，下面谈点我的看法。

首先，必须指出董事会依据公司章程作出回购A类股票的决议是合法的，虽然这里有B类股东操纵董事会违反信义义务之嫌疑，但是公司章程的意图正在于此（这也就是第4个问题的出题本意）。法官的判决应该不应有质疑。试想，如果A类股份在清算的时候直接以二倍于B类的资产分配权参与分配，而所得还不到＄60，董事会会作出以＄60的价格回购A类股份的决议吗？除非B类股东脑子有问题，才给A类股东多送钱。

第二，我要帮NEWEVER解释下他所谓的“三审”。各位，\"further/subsequent proceedings\"不是不同的审理或者同一的再次审理，我认为可以理解为一个审理的更深步骤，因为法官对问题的理解也不是一蹴而就的，也要渐渐深入的探讨啊！从文字的前面部分，我们可能都以为法官会支持原告的主张了，但是可以注意的是判词总用的是“assume\",\"assumption\",\"would\",\"mignt\",\"would have\"……等词，没有肯定的下结论。到看到第二部分的时候，法官才笔锋一转，让我找不到北——他到底想怎样！仔细回味，原来这些法官就靠这种手段混饭吃啊！英语老师总说，英文的思维习惯是开门见山，我看这个法官比我还会兜圈子：）

最后，我们来探讨下，在B类股东控制了董事会而作出回购决议的过程中，是否有违反信义义务的做法呢？我认为答案是肯定的。正如NEW哥所说，他们披露不够。而案例中也反复提到了一个问题，我认为也是最关键的问题，那就是回购A类股份和解散公司有怎样的联系呢？深入思考下，我们会发现，董事会决议回购A类股份的背后真正意图就在于解散公司让B类股东狠狠大捞一把；从某种角度来说，这种联系是必然的因果关系！但不是所有的A类股东都会明白董事会决议之深意，所以是董事会的披露不够给A类股东选择权的行使蒙上了一层阴影，以至于原告后来大呼上当。总之，董事会在回购前有义务向股东披露公司当时的财务状况，特别应当说明行将解散公司清算财产——要分家当啦，你们要想清楚哦！——这样才尽到了董事的职责啊。但是，他们在利益的驱动下没有这样做，才有了法官的判决：按照B类每股可以分到的资产和＄60加积累红利的差价，赔还给已经回购的A类股东。

今天早上才看这个案子，因为我还没有认真复习灰皮书，看这些老家伙写的英文真费劲啊！看了一早

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上，差点吐血和NEWEVER一起养伤：）所以片言只语不成体系，看到NEW的解答惭愧万分，但是写出来大家探讨，自己人也不怕笑话了。都来发言啊，我连吐血都来了，你还怕什么！？灰皮书Taylor案yi 案情简介：

原告租用被告的萨里郡公园和音乐大厅，用以举行四场盛大音乐会和日夜庆典，为期四天。原告同意每日支付100英镑。可是在演出到来之前，该公园被大火烧毁，对于火灾被告没有过错。于是，原告提起诉讼，以被告未能依约提供公园和音乐大厅为由，要求赔偿损失（包括宣传音乐会之各种广告费用，准备音乐会的各种费用和开支及其他相关费用）。

问题解析：

1 （1）当存在完成某一事件之确定和绝对的合同，该合同本身并非违法；（注：此为规则适用之前提）尽管由于不可预见的事故，使合同的履行变得出人意料地艰难甚至不可能，订约人仍然必须履行合同或为其不履行赔偿损失。即：一个人受其义务之绝对约束，不可因履行不能而免除其责任。

（2）如果当事人将某事物的继续存在作为履约的基础，并且缺乏对该事物存在的明示或默示的担保（此为之前提），那么该合同就不能被解释为绝对合同从而要受到一默示条件的：合同被违反前，若不存在订约人之过错而该事物灭失，从而使履行合同变得不可能，那么当事人的履约义务就得以解除。

2 在履行取决于特定的人或物的继续存在的合同中，存在着一项默示条件，即因该人或物的不复存在而导致履行不可能应使合同履行得到解除。

3 尽管罗马法也存在这种默示条件，但在英国法中这一规定并非源于罗马法，普通法的权威性法源证实了合同中事物继续存在的条件是由英国法引申而来。

在英国罗马法本身并非是一种权威性的依据，罗马法未能直接影响英国法；但罗马法为探究法律所依赖的原则提供了帮助，即罗马法的作用是间接性和辅助性的。他对英国法的形成并未产生多大作用，相反他成为英国解释法律原则的辅助工具

4 可以依本案判决，即：台风或不利自然条件的不发生，是按期到达的默示条件，当该事件发生而当事人不具有过错或承担风险，合同的义务就得以免除。

说特定事件的不会发生是合同双方的默示约定，仅仅是法律的虚构。也即认为当事人作了默示约定，并非当事人真的约定过，而仅指合理人处于当事人的地位，在案件涉及的事件发生情况下，不会再坚持合同效力。此为合同受挫所运用诸理论中的“默示条件”说。

另外，还想说两句的是，该案例主要考察两方面的理论：一为履约不能的免责条件；二为合同内容的法律解释。

对第一方面履约不能（亦称为“合同受挫”），英国法的理论与学说要比美国法丰富得多，“默示条件说”仅为其中一种。而美国法又分为“履行不能”与“目的落空”，相关理论亦有所不同。对第二方面合同解释，美国法相对完善，其理论发展为三大领域：

1 威利斯顿的客观标准说，该学说被吸纳入“第一次合同法重述”，首先，主张通过合同本身解释合同内容，探求通情达理之人（reasonable person)对合同的理解。上述情况不可能时才主张探求当事人之意图。 2 科宾的主观意图说，该学说被吸纳入“第二次合同法重述”，主张考虑周围一切之情况寻求当事人之真实意图，而不局限于合同本身。

3 卡多佐的合同扩张适用理论（expansive theory of contract), 即当事人意图不明之时，法官可以为其填补合同内容，通过默示推定而完善合同内容；然而，此种理论由于牵涉对“契约自由”的司法干预，因

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此要权衡“个人利益”与“社会利益”之得失后方可适用！！此为对该案例所涉理论的一个小小的总结！！

可以依本案判决，即：台风或不利自然条件的不发生，是按期到达的默示条件，当该事件发生而当事人不具有过错或承担风险，合同的义务就得以免除。

但对最后一个问题我有点不同意见。。不知道对不对

在海上货物运输中。台风是很正常的，和我们在马路上开车的时候出现红灯。然后停下来一个样。属于正常的。尤其是当今，在海上贸易航线的确定性和预报的准确性的情况下。这种台风应该是归入船方在签定航线的时候应该考虑的问题。我主张把这个当做是船方应该承担的风险。当然这里应该排除不能预见的特殊情况。比如那种没有办法抵抗。又没有预见的台风情况的出现。

我记得在英国海商法判例中有这样的判例。承运人主张因为台风而免除迟延交付的责任的时候。拒绝就是因为这个理由。

很赞同前三个问题的回答，但对第四个问题我有不同意见。台风或自然不利事件的发生应当是从事航海运输的人应当会考虑到的，通常在订立运输合同时，承运人除了应当计算航行顺利应当花费的时间，也应考虑因台风等事件可能给运输造成的延误，因此不能因此免除承运人的责任。

案例讨论－磨坊的那个

磨坊的零件坏了，拿去修，然后磨坊的小伙计说了得快点儿，我们那里都停业了，结果送货人还是疏忽以至于晚送了几天，害得磨坊少赚了不少钱。一审判了违约金２５镑，到后来（二审？）看那意思是不应该判惩罚金，因为对方可能会认为磨坊里头有备用的，可人家都说已经停业了，怎么还会有备用的呢？后面那两个题怎么答合适啊？请各位指教！

王军教授的美国合同法及其案例分析都详细讲到过这个案例。

“对方可能会认为磨坊里头有备用的（可能），可人家都说已经停业了，怎么还会有备用的呢”是枝节问题，主要问题是违约损害赔偿以合同双方签约时可预见到的因违约方的违约所造成的损失为限。合同法一案件:共同错误

灰片书中Wood v. Boynton and Another一案中,法官为什么不以显示公平为由推翻该交易? 很想听听大侠们的看法.

因为显失公平有两个构成方面：实质性显示公平与程序性显示公平。本案中双方的交易地位是平等的，不存在欺诈，胁迫等不公正的情况。还有的因素就是维护交易秩序吧。

案例讨论－挖井的那个

说的是一家人，新房子没有供水系统，然后和邻居公用一个，每月付邻居３$，但后来两家关系恶化，邻居使坏，老给停水，给他家带来不便，这家提起诉讼，一审判了１０美元违约金，２０００美元惩罚金，可后来为什么一下子就减到１美元的违约金和０元的惩罚金了呢？判决怎么说变就变呢？后来的上诉审判了恢复１０美元的违约金，但是没有恢复惩罚金，是因为美国不设惩罚金，即使是有意违约也不罚，这样不公平吧？我是说对于无意违约的人来说？对在场的所有人鞠躬道谢！

这个案子很短，而且法官分析的很清楚啊。法官对于违约而判给惩罚金是抱勉强态度的。惩罚金条款旨在惩罚当事人，以便对后人起警戒作用，通常用在侵权案子中。对于没有造成损失的违约一般会判nominal damage.一般1美圆左右（由于手头没有资料，灰皮书又两个月没看了，仅凭一点模糊印象，所以不太准确）。请教灰皮书－合同法胁迫案－造船案

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合同法胁迫案

North Ocean Shipping Co. V.

Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd. 第三问：

如果船主每次向造船厂发出电传或寄送款项时都讲一遍“without prejudice to our rights”

这句话，结果会如何？法官是如何看这句话的？说这句话的目的好象是保留以后对对方索赔的权利以前好象在哪本书上看到过时间太久忘了回去我给你翻翻看如果每次都在电报里加那句“如果没有损害我们的权利”的话，这就可以证明船主最后一

次付款不是对本来可以撤消的合同的确认。因为这说明付款只是被逼无奈的权宜之计，日后还是要主张自己的正当权利的。如果付款没有任何不愿意的意思表示，或者虽然内心有，但是没有表露出来，这只能认为是对合同的确认了

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